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GLOSSARY

Advanced Persistent Threats (APT s), are by far the biggest threat an organization
could deal with since it is continuous and persistent until it achieves its goal. An example
of that could be espionage from a different organization (Ponemon Institute LLC, 2014).
Community Sources, are members with trusted relationship with the energy
company. Examples would be providers, suppliers or subsidiaries that has an economical
mutual benefit from co-existing with the enterprise. For Example, Saudi Aramco, has
close ties with Saudi Arabia Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) another petrochemical
company that could share information related to Cyber Threat Intelligence. Nonetheless,
due to the nature of the company government security reports could also be available due
to the national security implications of the company’s operational requirement.
Deterrence, is the ability to retaliate and render the attacker means of attacking
unavailable.
External Sources, are broken into two categories one which is publicly available
information, and other paid reports from Security Agencies.
Hacktivists, are a group of individuals that are motivated by political agenda
trying to influence decision making by inflecting damage or sabotaging the image of the
targeted organization.
ICS, Industrial Control System (ICS) are systems that provide the ability to
control industrial systems from a centralized location or a single device.
Insider Threats, is considered one of the top Attackers Category since its human
in nature which is unpredictable. Employees who are disgruntled or others with ability to
go over their clearance could prove to be a huge threat to any organization (Ponemon
Institute LLC, 2014).
Internal Sources, such as Incident reports or data logs gathered from devices such
as firewalls and routers or monitoring systems that secures networks and end nodes.

x
Nation State Actors, Another Attacker Category in the Threat Intelligence
framework with organizations and global economy under political agenda it shows that
sometimes nations gain from actions against organization being it a cyber war or
retaliation of some sort (Ponemon Institute LLC, 2014).
Prevention and protection, All actions and process in place that fortifies the
organization and minimizes the damage that can be taken by adversaries and this goes
along with the minimum required from any organization regardless of the adversary in
place.
Resilience, This strategy capitalizes on the fact the failure is inevitable and
therefore minimizing the damage and effect after the fact should be minimal in assets and
down time.
SCADA System, is a Supervisory Control System & Data Acquisition. That
manages the gathering of data collected from a set of devices and displays it in a user
friendly manner appropriate to the industry it is implanted in.
Script Kiddie, Another Attacker Category in the Threat Intelligence, who are
usually individuals with no real agenda other than self-gratification from the ability to
bypass security measures or inflicting damage to an easy target (Mateski, et al., 2012).

xi

ABSTRACT

Alaskandrani, Faisal T. M.S., Purdue University, December 2015. A Threat Intelligence
Framework for Access Control Security In The Oil Industry. Major Professor: Marcus
Rogers.

The research investigates the problem raised by the rapid development in the technology
industry giving security concerns in facilities built by the energy industry containing
diverse platforms. The difficulty of continuous updates to network security architecture
and assessment gave rise to the need to use threat intelligence frameworks to better asses
and address networks security issues. Focusing on access control security to the ICS and
SCADA systems that is being utilized to carry out mission critical and life threatening
operations. The research evaluates different threat intelligence frameworks that can be
implemented in the industry seeking the most suitable and applicable one that address the
issue and provide more security measures. The validity of the result is limited to the same
environment that was researched as well as the technologies being utilized. The research
concludes that it is possible to utilize a Threat Intelligence framework to prioritize
security in Access Control Measures in the Oil Industry.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1

Statement of the Problem

Due to the long lasting life cycle of energy industry facilities, control systems
installed exceed their warranty or support period from different parties involved such as
the operating system developer. Without the appropriate support, Industrial Control
System (ICS) and Supervisory Control System & Data Acquisition SCADA systems
become more prone to vulnerabilities and open to threats with no appropriate measures to
overcome or contain the situation (Choo, 2011). Therefore, continuously finding
appropriate measures and best practices that can be implemented across different
platforms and segregated systems is a challenge and a security concern for companies
and stakeholders in the energy section industry. A Threat Intelligence Framework in
place would help streamline the process needed to fortify the facility and systems in
place.
1.2

Significance of the Problem

The changing nature of the ICS systems developed for the energy industry has
shifted from closed networks to open and connected ones (Igure, Laughter, & Williams,
2006). Although this provides greater, faster and easier access to involved parties and
beneficiaries of those systems, it also poses a huge security threat. Systems developed in
the past relied on isolation as a mechanism of protection and, therefore, security measures
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had not been addressed. While the environment has changed from isolation to inclusion,
the premise is still affecting the development cycle of the ICS and SCADA systems being
used (Sommestad, Ekstedt, Holm, & Afzal, 2010). Moreover, the energy industry
facilities in general are built and designed to last for several decades with minimum
changes and continued maintenance. Therefore, hardware being used and systems
installed eventually become obsolete, yet necessary for continues operation (Gold, 2009).
Nonetheless, continuing to addressing those security concerns is important to companies
working in the energy industry; hence, a threat intelligence framework is required.
Furthermore, the huge shadow bestowed by the energy industry; and specifically,
the oil industry above all industries, begs the question of how important it is to the world
economics and countries exporting or importing energy resources. Therefore, securing
the production in different operations in those industries will help countries maintain their
economic status, income, or revenue.
1.3

Scope of the Study

This study was limited to facilities hosting the Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems (SCADA). Furthermore, the study
focuses on the energy section and primarily the oil industry within it. Moreover, the study
involves Saudi Aramco Oil Company as an example that is used in this research. The
company was selected due to the researcher’s knowledge about the company during its
recent cyber-attack in 2013.
Security challenges has been restricted to the lifecycle of the ICS and SCADA
system development with regards to the operating system platforms and in conjunction
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with current technologies associated with network security and threats. The research
discusses several intelligence frameworks in order to find the suitable one that addresses
continues reinforcement of network security.
1.4

Purpose of the Study

Today, ICS systems are rapidly evolving from proprietary to open standard
protocols, from special purpose hardware and software to common Information
Technology (IT) products, and from isolation to interconnection with corporate networks.
Moreover, ICS systems were never designed with security in mind and many contain
numerous security related vulnerabilities. On the other hand, technologies and devices
used in the network industry out rapidly evolving providing a wider area of attack for any
adversary. Therefore, continues revision and evaluation of network security procedures,
practices, and devices is crucial to maintaining a safe and operational facility (Hieb,
Chreiver, & Graham, 2013).
This thesis discussed threat intelligence frameworks that can be applied to
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) security challenges such as ICS cyber security
requirements, interactions with outside networks to gain access to security patches, and
antivirus. The thesis explored several frameworks that could support the continuity of
securing facilities and operation across the corporate network of Saudi Aramco.
1.5

Research Question

Can a threat intelligence framework prioritize security access control upgrades for
industrial control systems in the oil industry?

4
1.6

Assumptions, Limitations & Delimitations

In this section the author is going to describe the assumptions and limitations and
delimitations of the research question.
1.6.1 Assumptions

The current list is of assumptions for this master’s thesis:
1- Information provided in the report is accurate and precise
2- Access control systems are appropriately maintained
3- SCADA system operators are experts and knowledgeable
4- No intentional error or malicious intention with employees working in
security or handling ICS systems
5- Systems are updated appropriately
6- Security records are properly maintained and documented
7- Study assumes open budget and available funding for required security
measures
8- Reasonable adherence to well-known Security and best practices
9- Compatibility measures are in place between different vendors and
devices
10- Control systems installed are properly tested and verified before
deployment and startup of the facility
11- Implementation of any framework is done in concurrence with any
shutdown.
12- A single facility is used for framework comparison.
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1.6.2 Limitations

The current list is the limitations for this master’s thesis:
1- Sample and study was limited to the energy section industry
2- Information related to access control security was used.
3- Information is limited to public available resources only
4- Comparison is done based on a single facility
5- Financial expenses is limited to design and hardware required
6- Facilities being compared is limited to single stage facilities and not
multiple stages.
7- Comparison values assigned to the framework is based on researcher
personal knowledge in the industry.

1.6.3 Delimitations

The current list is of delimitations for this master’s thesis:
1- Security controls that are not associated with access control as not
included
2- Reports that are not cleared by Saudi Aramco was not used
3- Incomplete reports was not included in the study as source of information
4- Manpower required is not factored in this study.
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1.7

Summary

The research at hand is addressing the means of continuously securing access
control systems deployed in the energy section industry in order to protect its multiple
layer network and different platforms. Security measures have been known to be an issue
in facilities in the industry due to the nature of the business being static over long periods
of time while technological advances in the network architecture changes rapidly (Gold,
2009).
Having different operating systems and control systems as well as hardware
installed in facilities built for decades stands create a challenge for security experts to
maintain security in general. Nonetheless, access control security is one aspect that eludes
more than any since human evolvement is a major aspect. Restricting access has been one
of the prime security measures that is known to humanity. Yet, in this century it has
transcended physical world and introduced digital and virtual environments as well.
After examining and identifying the research merits, scope and significance the
next chapter discusses current threat intelligence frameworks that can be utilized in the
energy industry. Researcher provided an insight on literature available that is related to
the research topic in the industry.
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CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The energy industry has always been crucial to world economics. Governments
pay close attention and interest to the sector, and private companies are always catering
and investing in supplying their demands and needs. The Industrial Control Systems
(ICS) and Supervisory Control and Acquisition systems (SCADA) are both examples of
systems that are used by energy companies and customized to their desire or to how
much is being paid. Nevertheless, such systems have their own product life cycle (PLC)
that affects the security and business continuity of companies working in the energy
industry including oil and gas.
The nature of the operation environment, being its economic importance to the
stake holders or the safety of the employees running the equipment adds to the
importance of security including access control measures (Leith & Piper, 2013).
Moreover, ICS systems deal with life threatening variables such high pressure, power,
temperature, and flow. Each of these, if not controlled and properly monitored, could lead
to casualties and irreversible consequences to the involved assets or environment.
2.1

Variables in ICS

Facilities in the energy industry are built to last for several decades with minimum
changes given regular maintenance. Therefore, hardware and software selection and
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installation is meticulous to insure compatibility and minimum intervention (Ralstona,
Grahamb, & Hiebb, 2007). In fact, ICS and SCADA systems and their operating systems
(OS) are selected based on compatibilities and, in some cases, the system is designed to
run on a specific version of an operating system exclusively. Consequently, that decision
has a huge effect on the security aspect of the system and the level of support available
including the access control measures used.
ICS systems are very unique and there are many companies that develops it all
around the world. For example, Emerson Process Management, Honeywell Process
Solutions, Invensys, Siemens Energy & Automation, Yokogawa Electric(McMahon &
Montague, 2005). Unlike the ICS systems that can be very unique and distinct even from
the same company, operating systems running those programs are mostly one of three;
Windows, UNIX and Linux. In addition, one major difference between them is in the
proprietary and licensing. UNIX is one of the oldest Operating systems and was initially
developed around 1970. The system was proprietary and licenses were needed to procure
the OS. Linux was developed to be a look a-like system similar to UNIX but it was an
open source system available to anyone. Several versions have been released since the
early 1990s. However, some UNIX based systems are considered open source and could
be acquired without licenses or purchasing. Windows was also developed after UNIX.
However, due to its graphical user interface and ease of use it has become a dominant
operating system in the industry despite the fact that it is proprietary and requires
purchased licenses to operate.
Furthermore, these differences are important and come into place when product
support is sought. ICS system vendors could support their systems long after deploying
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them at any given time but Operating systems do not share that flexibility if offered.
Linux is supported by groups and enthusiasts with no professional entity or authority
backing the operating system because of their open source nature. UNIX based systems,
are licensed and support in any customized system is mostly limited or very expensive.
Windows, on the other hand, provides support for 10-15 years, including the extended
support period. That time frame is considered very short for industries working in the
energy section (Windows, 2014).
With short or limited operating system support, running delicate and sensitive ICS
systems that has long passed its own product life cycle support provided by its vendor
presents a danger. The safety and security of those systems are jeopardized, including the
access control measures implemented (Gold, 2009).
2.1.1 Operating Systems
Operating systems are software responsible to manage hardware and software
resources available to be used by applications installed while interpreting inputs and
reflecting outputs (Stallings, 2012). As mentioned earlier, the three major operating
systems are UNIX, Linux, and Windows. Discussing those will provide a better
understanding about long-term support of those platforms.
UNIX, is multitasking, multiuser system utility developed by AT&T, however
some companies had customized it and therefore licenses can be needed. In the case of
custom designed systems support is limited and cannot be depended upon by industries in
the energy section due to the high threat, demand and safety concerns associated with it.
Nevertheless, ICS developers utilizing Unix-based software solution will provide the
support needed to troubleshoot issues. That being said, their knowledge in both the OS
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and software is a great asset since all the interactions and interfaces are known and
available for troubleshooting code line by line (Ritchie & Thompson, 1978).
Linux, is an open source system and is therefore similar to the UNIX system. ICS
developers utilizing the Linux-based systems will take ownership and responsibility in
troubleshooting any issue including ones related to the operating system (Linux, 2009).
Windows, is a completely different and is more like a “black box” to ICS
developers. The development is done based on an application programming interface
(API) that is published by Microsoft. Thus, support provided by the ICS vendor is limited
to the software itself and is closely related to OS functions, rather than the complete OS.
Therefore, OS support is basically what is offered and regulated by Microsoft licenses
(Strom, 2015). This two layer interaction can cause issues in pinpointing problems and
therefore delay solutions of mitigations.
In summary, an Oil Facility that has Industrial systems such as ICS and SCADA
might be able to get support to those programs if something was to go wrong. However,
that could not be said about the Operating Systems that are running it. As time goes by
support to these OS becomes very limited and sometimes not available and thus affects
the complete platform in which ICS and SCADA software is running on.
2.1.2 Industrial Control Systems
Due to security reasons ICS developers in the past have requested in some cases
full isolation of their system from all other networks and devices not associated with their
system to guarantee its operation and reliability. Systems developed and installed have
been carefully installed as “islands” with no outside communication or correspondence.
That isolation has provided a false sense of security. The fact that systems are not
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connected to the outside world or external variables give the illusion that it is protected
because it is autonomic and enclosed. Consequently, security practices in developing
their software was neglected or non-existent (Nicholson, Webber, Dyer, Patel, & Janicke,
2012). However, due to isolation, those problems did not surface to the point where it
became the center of attention in order to have it addressed.
In reality, conversions of networks have been the norm in this decade. Systems
are no longer isolated in “islands of networks”. Communication between different
systems is becoming more and more essential for continuance and optimized operation
(Ralstona, Grahamb, & Hiebb, 2007). While the network structure changed, the security
practices in developing the ICS systems has yet to catch up or own up to the challenge.
Developers have been adding security as an additive feature following the completion of
the ICS software instead of employing it in every step of the process. This huge
difference in attitude leads to vulnerabilities in the system, including access control
issues.
Furthermore, on average the development cycle of an ICS or SCADA system
ranges from 3-5 years, based on the range and complexity of the system. Nonetheless,
developers in some cases are willing to provide support to their software for up to 15
years after discontinuation (Bradbury, 2012). Yet, that support is usually operational in
nature and very rarely includes security or access control updates or fixes to their system.
2.1.3 Access Control
Access Control is measures, workflows and procedures put in place to limit,
manage access to physical locations or logical systems. Access is either granted or not. If
Access is permitted then the level of access could be put in place to limit and manage it
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by giving access to everything or some things. Details and examples are shown in this
section..
Are security measures in place to limit the availability of information, systems or
functionality to privileged or assigned personal, that includes hardware and software
mechanisms ranging from key cards to passwords to monitor and audit establishing
accountability and attribution? History has shown that gates and barriers are the means
needed to limit access or protect physical assets. However, with the technology age and
virtual world, user names and passwords have been the main way of implementing
logical access control. In reality, critical facilities implement both for added security.
Nonetheless, a single means of authentication is no longer valuable or rendered secure
(Warfield, 2012).
With advancements in technology, authentication using biological features has
been utilized and implemented. For example, finger prints, eye scanners, voice
recognition and facial recognition devices have been used as secondary access control
measures. Moreover, tokens generating systematic numbers and other system generating
massages with pass codes to systems are also being used as a secondary measure for
identification (Vaidya, Makrakis, & Mouftah, 2013).
Generally, a mix and match approach among the previous concepts is
implemented in facilities based on level of security, budget and importance. Therefore, in
industrial facilities physical gates and walls are in place and secure identification cards
are being used to physically limit access to the facility. On the other hand, access to a
system is controlled using passwords and a secondary access control such as finger print

13
or tokens. In some cases different locations within facilities require other layers of access
control (Wiles, et al., 2007).
Consequently, access control information needs to be managed, monitored and
maintained to insure up to date information. Therefore, a centralized system or server is
put in place to manage those credentials. Nevertheless, the task is difficult to maintain in
a multi-layer network configuration or a mixed system environment in which different
people have different access levels in different or multiple systems. For example, Several
Employees might be given different levels of access to individual systems, Employee A
is allowed Admin privilege on System B but only user privilege on system C, and
Employee B is allowed Admin privilege on system C but only view access to system B.
2.1.4 Threats
Now days, technology threats in the Oil Industry have been mostly external.
Therefore, protections and counter measures were tailored to secure the systems from
outside access. However, since ICS systems and SCADA systems have been always in
isolation that was not an issue and therefore external attacks were not considered
threatening. Thus, the focus was on internal employees’ privileges and level of clearance.
But with the expansion and development in the network structure of those devices and
systems, external threats have been introduced to the equation once again. In fact, such
threats are in some cases carried out by large entities including government agencies
(Warfield, 2012). For example, the Stuxnet virus that was deployed to a specific
Honeywell system in only a certain country and in limited numbers of nuclear facilities
(Genge, Siaterlis, Fovino, & Masera, 2012). Another example would be, the Shamoon
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incident that hit Saudi Aramco, the biggest oil producing company in the world located in
Saudi Arabia (Helman, 2012).
Since threat levels have increased and the surface of attack has widened with the
shear range of networks interconnected together, it stands to be reasoned that old security
methods of managing access control to sensitive systems such as ICS and SCADA should
be questioned (Willems & Software, 2011).
On the other hand, connectivity between networks introduces corporate users that
are interested in analyzing and observing the data outputted from their end node points in
their facilities. Introducing different business needs onto the operational requirements for
optimization and reporting purposes increases the internal threat level to SCADA and
ICS systems exposed. Storey (2009) stated that understanding the process control
network in which SCADA and ICS rides on is very important however, people and
politics should not be neglected and thus should be considered if a truly secure solution is
to be built.
2.1.5 Current Studies
Researchers have been studying the issue in detail, especially with the wide range
of systems in place including legacy systems. A study suggesting using add-on measures
to legacy systems utilizing microkernel-based architecture isolates network-interacting
where bloom filters are in place to authenticate commands and access levels have been
published recently (Hieb, Chreiver, & Graham, 2013). Such studies provide different
meanings to accomplish access control measures, especially in an environment where
systems could have been put in place more than a decade ago. Nevertheless, other
solutions have also been introduced that utilize public-key certificates in conjunction with
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zero-knowledge protocol in server aided verification (SAV), attribute certificates and
multiple factor and level authentications (Vaidya, Makrakis, & Mouftah, 2013).
Other studies showed the lack of effective security measures and total reliance on
a single mechanism for access control, and that is usually demonstrated by the developers
of the ICS and SCADA system (Cetinceviz & Bayindir, 2012). For Example, Systems
that only used single user name and password without biometric authentication or the
other way around. Nevertheless, some also discuss the threats and vulnerabilities added to
those systems due to improper implementations stemming from lack of knowledge,
complexity of the system, insufficient funds and missing required documentation
(Sommestad, Ekstedt, Holm, & Afzal, 2010).
“In 2010, Singapore’s Senior Minister of State for Law & Home Affairs
explained that ‘with the ever-changing cyber landscape, we can expect to see adversaries
evolve and come up with new threats to circumvent our security defenses. [And flagged
that it] is therefore necessary for the IT security industry as a whole to step up to the plate
to meet this challenge with innovative and strategic solutions against these emerging
threats“ (Choo, 2011, p. 728). Moreover, focus and attention should be added into the
development life cycle of ICS and SCADA systems.

2.2

Typical Oil Field Infrastructure Design

Now that the author have covered different aspects of the Control Systems used in
an oil field facilities, it is important to draw a complete picture of how the facilities are
typical designs while covering the difference access control measures implemented.
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2.2.1 Access Control
At first Physical Access Control is discussed; any facility that deals with energy
and due to safety reasons is always protected. Typically, Facilities will have a wall
surrounding it or a means to limit access and control incoming and outgoing personal. At
the entrance, people are provided access after being searched and their work
Identification Card is checked. Depending on the criticality of the facility, a secondary
biometric measure might be in place. It is important to note that within those facilities
there are command centers and other locations that implements further security measures
that is not available to all employees and requires a certain level of clearance.
After gaining access to the locations that include the systems monitoring and
controlling the facilities and the production of the oil logical access control measures will
be in place, an engineer will typically be given a station that includes a password
protected system that requires login using previously assigned accounts. Some of those
systems are specialized to provide different access levels based on employee’s job
classification or clearance level. For example, an operator will be able to see different
reading of pressure and oil flow rate from a specific well, but only an engineer can
modify settings to increase or decrease the flow rate by adjusting the well head opening
or turbine rotation speed.
Unfortunately, even with this detailed access control measures some ICS vendors
and SCADA vendors will also dictate shared user accounts that are used by multiple
personals. For example, a single user name and password for all operators, or a generic
password that is used to share data across multiple systems via a centralized database that
cannot be changed. In the following section, the author discussed the network design and
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different devices that are attached to it and the access control security measures that it
carries.
2.2.2 Network Design
So before getting into the security details of the network design, the author will
discuss the flow of information, what is the point of origin? Destination? As well, as the
users?
At the start, an oil facility objective is to be able to produce oil by extracting it
from the geographical topology in the area, refine it from any contamination and stabilize
it for transportation in order to sell it. Those three functions can be done in a single
facility or several facilities that each carries a single functionality before transferring the
oil to the next one (ABB, 2013).
Once an oil reservoir is found a study is made to decide the best locations to drill
wells to maximize production and limit pockets of oil that cannot be extracted. Once the
order is in place an oil well is drilled and several sensors are installed in the well head to
monitor several oil attributes such as temperature, pressure, and flow rate. When refining
the oil other devices are installed that monitors other attributes such as the density,
composition (Cetinceviz & Bayindir, 2012). These sensors produce the raw data that is
usually stored locally at a Remote Terminal Unit (RTU). The RTU stores data for a
defined time while formatting it and preparing it for transportation over a network to the
local command center. Communication could be done via radio, GSM, WI-FI, or fiber
optic cables. Similar to a tree structure where the oil fields represents the tree leaves data
is usually aggregated over several networking nodes before it reaches the trunk or in our
example the main command center database.
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After that data is being created from the sensors in the field and information is
being transported via the network from the RTUs to the local database, SCADA systems
and ICS applications utilizes that data to graphically represent the information for
operators and engineers on site. Operators monitor those values to ensure operational
wells are producing the required amount of oil, set forth by engineers, decided by
management, and dictated by market demand. Operators also monitor well activities for
any anomaly or safety concern due to the high pressure high temperature values of the oil
being extracted (Cetinceviz & Bayindir, 2012).
Typically, information gathered in the database from the oil field sensors is also
accessed by research and development for further refinement and future studies or
expansion to the reservoir. If the company has operations in different reservoirs or
different facilities on the same one, data might be aggregated to a higher and bigger
centralized data base from the local facilities. Data is owned and used by the facilities it’s
produced from. Nevertheless, other employees that might not be within that facility itself
also use it.
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Figure 2-1 Typical Smart Wellhead Design

The above diagram is developed based on many oil facilities that was visited and
is considered a typical design for a smart oil wellhead implementation. As shown in the
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graph above, Security Access Control measures are usually implemented in the RTU
around every oil well head to protect the data source. However, since those locations are
usually scattered across a large areas and sometimes in very remote locations, physical
security is sometime a huge challenge. RTUs are usually installed in cabinets that require
special keys to open and the RTU consul itself is password protected.
Every device on the network such as routers that are used to aggregate several
RTU traffic into a single network is also password protected within a cabinet. This is in
case it was being transported via fiber optic or different radio relay stations. If it was via
GSM network then communication is directed directly to the local database via the
telecommunication network of the GSM Company.
The next step is the local database that is also password protected and physically
secure in a limited access room hosting several critical servers and devices. In some cases
this could be the last and final location where data is being stored and in others it could
be simply another aggregation point before its being sent to a bigger centralized
Database.

2.3

Threat Intelligence Frameworks

For an enterprise, threat intelligence is “an ecosystem of contextually relevant and
evidence-based knowledge – integrated into platforms and tools – to quickly and
accurately address dangers to individuals, organizations, or assets in a standardized,
consumable format.” (Los, Robinson, Clark, Brooks, & Brown, 2014, p. 2)
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Planning &
Direction

Dissemination

Analyzing

Resource
Collection

Processing

Figure 2-2 Five Stages of Threat Intelligence

In general, the lifecycle of a given threat Intelligence framework goes over the
above five stages shown in Figure 2-2. The planning stage is where goals are set and
decisions are made as of what is should be protected. In the resource stage, resources are
allocated to support the goal set in the first stage. Processing is the stage in which data is
being acquired and information is gathered to achieve the goal set in the planning stage
and within the limitation of the resources allocated. The Analyzing stage is where
everything gathered is studied and analyzed to get results that help achieve our planned
target. Finally Dissemination stage is where the results of all the previous stages have
been achieve and is being implemented or distributed to induce action and change
towards the goal set in the very beginning (Rocha, 2015).
To compare the frameworks selected out of these five stages the following three is
discussed: Processing, Analyzing, and Dissemination. Each of which can be broken into
more sub categories and specialized segments. Yet they are always streamlined after each
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other. Information provided from intelligence sources is analyzed to identify threats and
means of protection that is then implemented as a response in order to mitigate and
address those issues. The following sections will discuss those categories.

2.3.1 Planning
In an energy sector or an enterprise that is striving to supply power to its
customers the main driver for threat intelligence process is to secure and maintain assets
and operational continuity (Farnham, 2013). However, in Saudi Aramco the company
accounts for 80% of the national income GDP therefore the security of the enterprise is
also driven by national security and the country’s economic stability or existence (CIA,
2014).
2.3.2 Intelligence Sources
In general, enterprises in the energy sector are relatively similar in their sources of
information. That includes internal sources, community, and external sources that are
identified in the definitions section (Farnham, 2013). However, those sources are also
broken into two more general categories, open source and private. Open source
information is what is available and accessible free while private sources are ones that are
not, which may include but not limited to, internally developed sources or feeds
purchased from other third party security companies.
2.3.3 Requirements of Threat Intelligence
In order to automate and collaborate efforts with such systems a standardized
format needs to be available to share indications of compromise and other related security
aspects across devices and system to be able to analyze and respond to those reports.
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Tools have to be selected to cover all related aspects of security that is of concern to the
enterprise.
2.3.4 Analyzing Cyber Threat Intelligence Input
In every system, input gathered will greatly affect the quality of the system
results. KPGM International has defined it as “Is the ability to analyze cyber intelligence
gathered and to make links between discrete pieces of information to create actionable
intelligence” (KPMG International, 2013, p. 4). This can be achieved using automated
tools and trained operatives and personal.
2.3.5 Response to Cyber Threat Intelligence
From data that has been analyze actions are driven to mitigate security issues.
This phase is continually being evaluated in order to keep up with the development or
changes in the field. Nonetheless, respond is also affected by the kind of adversary or
attacker. Attackers can be classified into the categories found in the definition section,
Insider Threat, APT, Nation State Actors, Script Kiddie, and Hacktivist. (Ponemon
Institute LLC, 2014). With all those types of adversaries in mind tactics of defending and
the paths selected to respond is usually one of the following three mentioned below
(Miller & Lachow, 2008).
First is prevention and protection, it differs from organization to another based on
the level of sophistication and spending based on the expected area of effect and damage
influenced. Second is, Resilience, this could be a choice of action when the adversary is
Nation State or highly sophisticated APT. Third is Deterrence, which could be used when
dealing with APT and all types of adversaries other than nation state. Companies might
opt out of getting into this path due to lack of resource available to carry out such actions
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or due to issues of legalities. For Saudi Aramco, this option is one that is available to be
used.

2.4

Frameworks Selected

Upon reviewing ten threat intelligence framework the following, three covered
the complete process of threat intelligence in a given organization without being too
specific that it cannot be tailored to any given need or requirement by that specific
organization. The frameworks are;


National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Cybersecurity Framework



Open Source Threat Intelligence Framework (OSTI)



Collective Intelligence Framework (CIF)
2.4.1 NIST Cybersecurity Framework
The framework developed by NIST under the Executive Order 13636 given by

Barack Obama the current president to address the continues rising security threats to the
nations critical infrastructure. (Sedgewick, 2014). This framework is a voluntary
framework that helps reduce cyber risk to critical infrastructures. Since the Oil industry is
part of the energy infrastructure it is applicable and suitable to be used for the purpose of
this study. It’s also good to note that this framework is being continuously evaluated and
updated as need by NIST.

2.5

OSTI Framework

The framework is being taught by SANS institute. It utilizes open source
intelligence that can be analyzed for actionable intelligence. This framework is also
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developed in 2013 and is continually being updated by the institution (Maxwell, 2013). A
great example of how open source can assist and support in securing ICS and SCADA
system is a study made that tried to bridge the gap. In which he tries to shorten the gap
between the security professionals and the SCADA and ICS ones. A detailed simulation
and examples where provided that shows how open sources could be a viable and
affordable solution. (Nguyen, 2014)

2.6

Collective Intelligence Framework

The framework is based on an open source software on Google Code Hosting
services developed by the community of users. Currently it is being run and administrated
by a non-profit organization called CSIRT Gadgets Foundation. The code is also
available in GitHub for all developers and community users (CSIRTGadgets, 2015).

2.7

Summary

In general, ICS and SCADA systems have been tasked to handle real-time lifethreatening systems in order to manage critical infrastructures by governments and
private sectors. Security measures such as access control is lagging behind in the
development of those infrastructures. Threats introduced by the convergence of network
and internet connectivity have already caused damage and casualties in several incidents
in the past decade. Researchers have identified those gaps. However these gaps are still
affected by the continuous development of technologies, in relation to the product life
cycle of the ICS and SCADA system (Igure, Laughter, & Williams, 2006). With those
advancements, adversaries have a wider range of effect and damage.
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In this thesis an effort was made to focus on threat intelligence frameworks that
can be implemented to continually secure access control means in different OS
environments in the energy section. Scholars and researchers have been identifying
different measures that help protect infrastructures using access control methods such as
passwords, tokens and biometric features. However, such actions with intelligence
information gathered would help capitalize on budgets being spent in the right manner to
achieve security. In fact, examples in the following case studies have been published to
discuss the added security in enhancing such measures.
The importance of security is well acknowledged by entities related to the energy
industry. Therefore, this study will provide some information and insight that will help
prevent and secure assets and lives by its implementation. The mislead idea that cyber
attacks, malware and viruses cannot cause causalities is wrong. Affecting ICS and
SCADA systems remotely could cause undesirable reaction that could lead to explosions
or exposure to harmful gasses and material. Maintaining security and access control
measures by assessing and evaluating assets and procedures to eliminate unlawful action
or negligent decisions is a goal in farther securing facilities in the Energy industry (Wiles,
et al., 2007).
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CHAPTER 3. PROCEDURES AND DATA COLLECTION

3.1

Methodology

Information used in this research was initially suppose to be acquired from reports
and studies related to security and the oil and energy industry. However, due to the
security nature of such information it was unobtainable. Therefore, a point system was
developed that help rank different frameworks, based on the researcher experience in the
field as shown in this Chapter.

3.2

Data Collection

As a result to the sensitivity of the data being studied, data was to be collected
from public available reports related to the SCADA and ICS systems published or
released by companies or associates in the energy industry dealing with access control
security measure. Such companies are, Saudi ARAMCO, SABIC, Qatar Gas, Yokogawa.

3.3

Data Analysis

Data collected initially was supposed to be from open sources available and
subsequent to fully acquiring enough data, in order to find, similar patterns in the results
after analyzing the information. However, due to the nature of this data, being classified
as secure information and thus not available for public it was unfortunate that no
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company accepted to share security realted data that helps the research. Therefore, a point
system was created.

3.4

Criteria

After cross-analyzing ten of currently acceptable and used framework in the
industry, several criteria’s have been identified to be relevant to companies in the oil
industry or energy section in general. The following were the points used in this study to
evaluate different threat intelligence frameworks being applied to an oil company.
Followed by a simple table to score each of those criteria:
 Applicable: Can be implemented in Oil Company covering all assets ranging from
remote areas to business headquarters.
Expandable Horizontally: The ability to expand and include more assets/lactation as
needed.
 Expandable Vertically: The ability to add more hierarchical layers to the
Framework based on security requirements
 Ease of implementation: Implementation is understandable and easy to use by all
stake holders
 Expenses: Ranges from Free to very expensive in comparison to each other,
covering all implementation needed such as software/hardware/ procedures/ training.
 Flexible: Accepts variation of implementation based on several criteria such as
location, asset type, and security level
 Covers all sources of Data: does it cover all sources of data available? Or some
degree of it?
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 Provide measurable Results: Provide a meaningful number as an evaluation for an
asset or a security risk
 Provide Comparative Ranking: Ability to prioritize risks and vulnerabilities
 Recurring costs: how frequently does the framework require additional spending
to operate? Note this does not cover any security implementation or decisions derived
from the framework.
In the following table, criteria are either; binary, or points from 0-4. In some of
the criteria mentioned, the answer is either a yes or a no therefore maximum or minimum
point score was assigned to reflect that. As for the other criteria, the scale from 0-4 was
based on how much of the framework could be implanted, or how long it takes to be
implemented. Those values help rank the framework based on all the criteria selected.
Table 3-1 Criteria Table
Criteria

0

1

2

3

4

Applicable

No

25%

50%

75%

100%

Expandable Horizontally

No

-

-

-

Yes

Expandable Vertically

No

-

-

-

Yes

Ease of implementation

5 Year

3 Years

2 Years

1 Years

> 1 Year

Expenses

1M

500K

250K

100K

Free

Flexible

No

Covers all sources of data

No

25%

50%

Provide Measurable Results

No

-

-

Provide Comparative Ranking

No

-

-

-

Yes

Recurring costs

1 Year

2 Years

3 Years

5 Years

0

Yes
75%

Yes
Yes
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3.5

Reliability

This research provides a unique conclusion that can be generalized in similar
settings and environments. However, with time passing by some of the findings might be
irrelevant due to fast nature of advancement in technology and hence security related
issues. Furthermore, the result achieved can be provided to several companies to assess
and confirm the findings. Research is reliable and results could be carried out in
companies working in the oil industry to test and ensure the efficiency of security
upgrade utilizing the threat intelligence framework
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CHAPTER 4. FINDINGS

As described in previous chapters, the objective of this study was to determine the
availability and ability of currently established and well-known threat intelligence
framework to rank security measures upgrades in the oil field industry.

4.1

NIST Cybersecurity Framework

The following table on the next page shows the scores given to each criteria
previously discussed in the mythology chapter for the NIST Cybersecurity Framework.
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Table 4-1 NIST Cybersecurity Framework
Criteria

Score

Applicable

Yes (4)

Expandable Horizontally

Yes (4)

Expandable Vertically

Yes (4)

Ease of implementation

Somewhat Difficult (1)

Expenses

Very Expensive (0)

Flexible

Yes (4)

Covers all sources of data

Yes (4)

Provide Measurable Results

Yes (4)

Provide Comparative Ranking

Yes (4)

Recurring costs
Total Points

Every 6 Months (0)
29

NIST, a framework developed by the US Federal Government scored the highest
in the comparison as proven by the upcoming results. The NIST Framework has been
generalized to the point that it can accommodate anything. However, that comes with a
price. In order to accommodate a company specific needs a lot of customization and in
house work will need to be done which makes it the most expensive framework with
difficulty in implementation and a huge toll on continue maintenance. Yet, the fruits of
this effort will be evident in providing the most related trusted actionable intelligence that
can be produced by any framework (NIST, 2014).
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4.2

OSTI Framework

The following table shows the scores given to each criteria previously discussed
in the mythology chapter for OSTI.
Table 4-2 OSIT Framework
Criteria

Score

Applicable

Yes (4)

Expandable Horizontally

Yes (4)

Expandable Vertically

Yes (4)

Ease of implementation

Normal (2)

Expenses

Free (4)

Flexible

Yes (4)

Covers all sources of data

No (0)

Provide Measurable Results

No (0)

Provide Comparative Ranking

No (0)

Recurring costs

No (4)

Total Points
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The Open Source Threat Intelligence Framework is free, with no recurring cost.
However, since data, sources are untrusted or vetted external sources it cannot be
actionable and trusted as NIST Framework. It is also important to note that it does not
cover all sources of data and only the ones that are available to public (Maxwell, 2013).
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4.3

Collective Intelligence Framework

The following table shows the scores given to each criteria previously discussed
in the mythology chapter for CIF.
Table 4-3 CIF
Criteria

Score

Applicable

Yes (4)

Expandable Horizontally

No (0)

Expandable Vertically

Yes (4)

Ease of implementation

Somewhat Difficult (1)

Expenses

Free (4)

Flexible

Yes (4)

Covers all sources of data

No (0)

Provide Measurable Results

Yes (4)

Provide Comparative Ranking

No (0)

Recurring costs

No (4)

Total Points
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Collective Intelligence Framework (CIF) is an open source software based
framework that aggregates data sources, unify information display and provide actionable
measures and results. Unfortunately, since its open source it is community driven and
sources that available for utilization are limited to extensions that provides appropriate
API to the main program. Thus, not all sources or types of data are vetted or can be used
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which makes comparative ranking of outputs difficult to nonexistent (CSIRTGadgets,
2015).

4.4

Comparison

Table 4-4 Frameworks Comparison
Criteria

NIST

OSTIF

CIT

Applicable

Yes (4)

Yes (4)

Yes (4)

Expandable Horizontally

Yes (4)

Yes (4)

No (0)

Expandable Vertically

Yes (4)

Yes (4)

Yes (4)

Somewhat Difficult
Ease of implementation

Somewhat

(1)

Normal (2)

Difficult (1)

Expenses

Very Expensive (0)

Free (4)

Free (4)

Flexible

Yes (4)

Yes (4)

Yes (4)

Covers all sources of data

Yes (4)

No (0)

No (0)

Provide Measurable Results

Yes (4)

No (0)

Yes (4)

Provide Comparative Ranking

Yes (4)

No (0)

No (0)

Every 6 Months (0)

No (4)

No (4)
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25

Recurring costs
Total Points

From the Table above it is evident that NIST scored better than the other
frameworks due to its general nature. However, OSTI is also a viable solution since it is
free with no continues upgrades required or maintenance cost, which also could be said
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about CIF. Nonetheless, since both OSTI and CIF use mainly publicly available sources
of intelligence it could hypothetically provide inaccurate risk information that might
drive a different priority ranking for potential security upgrades. Having said that, vetting
and vigorously analyzing all that public information is time consuming but could provide
some information that can be translated into actionable intelligence.
On the other hand, NIST covers all public and private information, which is
customizable to the specific organization threat factors and actors. Which in the end
provides the most accurate and reliable intelligence.
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION

In the previous chapters, the possibility of utilizing any threat intelligence
framework in prioritizing security upgrades in Access Control Systems in the oil industry
was discussed. The author covered different aspects and systems involved, what criteria
is important in defining what type of framework would be applicable, Finally, the author
used the mythology and scored the three different frameworks as shown in the results
chapter. In this chapter, a more detailed approach will explain our results while striving to
answer the research question.
In this chapter, results from the criteria developed were discussed while tying it
with the research question. This will help explain the relevant, as well as the score value
representation to our thesis problem.
Flexibility, Intel gathering is difficult and unique to any organization due to their
setup, type of equipment used, and network layout. It could also be different within
facilities in the same organization. In Fact, it could be argued that it is also different
within the diverse systems in the same facility. Which brings up the importance of having
a general framework that is flexible to accommodate change and diversity of the
organizational structure or operational design. In our results, it is apparent that all
frameworks selected have been identified as flexible frameworks.
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Expandability, is another criteria that is important since those facilities are
continually changing in order to keep up with the increase in demand or reduction in
production. The ability to expand horizontally by adding new nodes to the current layer is
very important since the drilling of oil wills is a frequent operation that is carried out to
increase production or replace maintain current flow rate. Expanding vertically, is more
hierarchical in nature and is needed to generalize information to different levels of
stockholders such as local supervisors, general supervisors, managers, etc. This is a great
feature to have but not a necessity like the ability to expand horizontally.
Furthermore, the rest of the criteria are variables that simply helps differentiate
between the frameworks. For example, how expensive is it to implement and if it has any
reoccurring costs is something that might be important to some users more than others
might. Ease of implementation might be another factor to be taken into consideration
based on the organizational size. The last three criteria that might be of most concern are,
verity of sources being used, ability to provide measurable results or comparative
ranking. Those three criteria are what the author discussed in the following sections of
this chapter in more details.
5.1.1 Frameworks Data Inputs
Information gathered as mentioned previously is very important in defining the
quality and reliability of your out coming output. Being able to cover all sources of data
is very important. However, not all frameworks selected in this study was able to
incorporate all data sources. NIST cybersecurity framework is flexible and generalized in
such a way that it can accommodate any source of input wither its publicly available, inhouse developed or third party provided. On the other hand, OSTI framework deals with

39
the open source data, which is available freely by other organizations. CIF, is also limited
and its limitation has nothing to do with cost. CIF limitation is based on add-ons and
plugins that are developed by the community to accept and normalize feeds to be used by
the system. Therefore, a source can only be used if it has an appropriate extension that is
added to the main program to interpret and utilize its feed. Therefore, NIST seems to be
the only Framework that can accommodate any type of source.
5.1.2 Frameworks Ability to Measure results
The ability to quantify the values of inputs and threats provided is very helpful in
providing a general understanding of ranking among data. Thus, again our three
frameworks are very different in these criteria. NIST once more since it is flexible and
designed by the user specification is able to provide such information that is set forth by
the user. CIF, is also able to provide that as part of the software package. However, the
OSTI framework does not provide such information. Being able to assign numbers to
threat actors or vulnerabilities discovered is helpful in future analysis leading to potential
ranking among those inputs.
5.1.3 Frameworks Ability to Rank Results
NIST, yet again seems to be able to accommodate this criteria since it is
customized and designed by the user. That could not be said to the other two frameworks
since information provided and sources of data are not comprehensive in nature or do not
provide measurable data. This makes NIST cybersecurity framework the most suitable
one to potentially answers the research question in hand.

40
5.2

Conclusion

Out of all Frameworks selected, NIST has shown the ability to be adoptable,
flexible and reliable. However, that comes with a huge price tag and an ongoing cost on
the organization. The reason NIST framework is able to accommodate any criteria being
set is the inherited nature of it being generalized to accommodate any industry or
organization that strives to implement it. The continues in-house customization of the
framework will yield the best results imaginable for any organization as long as its
carried out appropriately.
Nonetheless, Open Source Threat Intelligence or Collective Intelligence
Framework, should not be completely excluded because for a small organization with
limited resources either of them could be a solution that increases security measures in a
better way than simply going in blind. In Fact, even with available financial resources,
the size of the company or the manpower available might not justify the huge cost
encored from implementing a NIST framework (Holland, 2013).
Finally, the answer is not believed to be either or. A hybrid solution could be best
as well as less expensive than simply using a NIST cyber security framework. NIST
framework provides all the guidelines necessary to be implemented for a threat
intelligence framework to be used in an organization. Data and information is being
developed and analyzed in-house driving decisions and upgrades needed (Shackleford,
2015). However, it does not exclusively throw out the possibility of utilizing Open source
intelligence feeds. In fact, it is possible to use the open source threat intelligence
framework to help focus the data being analyzed and developed within the organization
without neglecting the other complete picture. Furthermore, the Collective Intelligence
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Framework could be used as a platform to help streamline all sources that include open
one and the ones that are developed in house or even ones that are acquired by third
parties. The financial cost of developing a complete threat intelligence framework
platform for NIST drops down to a set of extensions that are uniquely used by the
organization facilitating the use of the CIF.
Finally, going back to the research question, is it possible to prioritize Access
control Security upgrades within an organization in the oil industry utilizing a threat
intelligence framework ? The answer is yes, it can be done using the NIST framework
separately or in conjunction with other frameworks.
Nevertheless, this research was also able to identify a ranking system that can be
utilized to score and evaluate any security framework and its applicability to a specific
company within the energy section industry. Those criteria can be given a different scale
based on the company’s unique needs. Results will be reliable and a definite answer will
emerge upon successfully applying it similar to the research in hand.

5.3

Future Research

Now that the answer was found using the frameworks available, a question arises
if those frameworks are optimum specifically for the oil and gas industry. Is it possible to
develop a new framework that is more efficient and suitable for the industry? Can a
framework be developed that is less expensive? Or with minimum ongoing cost ? How
difference is this to an electrical or energy specific Organization? Could this be
implemented to get actual results that verify our findings?
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